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Quantum key distribution (QKD) offers a practical solution for secure communication between
two distinct parties via a quantum channel and an authentic public channel. In this work, we
consider different approaches to the quantum bit error rate (QBER) estimation at the information
reconciliation stage of the post-processing procedure. For reconciliation schemes using LDPC codes
we develop a novel syndrome-based QBER estimation algorithm. The suggested algorithm is suitable
for irregular LDPC-codes, and takes into account punctured and shortened bits. With testing our
approach in the real QKD setup, we show that an approach combining the proposed algorithm with
conventional QBER estimation techniques allows improving accuracy of the QBER estimation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum computing possesses a threat on currently
used information security protocols based on asymmetric
cryptography [1]. A possible solution for establishing se-
cure data transmission in the post-quantum era is to use
the QKD technology [2]. This technology has attracted
an enormous amount of interest [2–4] last decades, and
commercial QKD systems are now widely available on
the market [4].
Unlike conventional cryptographic tools, the security
of QKD is based on the laws of quantum physics. In
particular, QKD protocols such as the seminal BB84 [5]
use individual quantum objects (e.g., photons) as infor-
mation carriers. However, classical communication and
post-processing procedures are also required for QKD
systems. Due to noise in the quantum channel, after a
quantum key establishment phase legitimate users have
sifted keys that are weakly correlated and partially se-
cure [2]. In order to correct down this error rate to the
standard level, industrial QKD systems use information
reconciliation procedures.
The primary idea of information reconciliation is to re-
move discrepancies between keys of parties by disclosing
some information over the authentic channel. Further,
disclosed bits of information shall be removed from the
key within the privacy amplification procedure. The less
information is disclosed, the higher efficiency a scheme
demonstrates. The efficiency and the number of addi-
tional communication rounds taken by scheme influence
the rate of secret key generation. Thus, these are one of
the main performance indicators of QKD setups.
Among state-of-the-art reconciliation schemes one can
distinguish protocols exploiting LDPC codes [6–8] to cor-
rect errors. They adopt an altered version of the con-
ventional syndrome decoding algorithm to correct errors
between blocks of the sifted keys. Significant improve-
ments of the information reconciliation procedure with
the use of LDPC codes have been suggested [9–15]. The
latest development, called symmetric blind reconciliation
protocol, is based on introducing symmetry in operations
of parties, and the consideration of results of unsuccess-
ful belief-propagation decodings [14]. Consequently, this
method allows to increase the procedure efficiency signif-
icantly and to reduce its interactivity, which leads to an
increase in the secure key generation rate.
We note that LDPC-based reconciliation schemes use
an estimation of the QBER as one of the decoding algo-
rithm parameters. Due to that, inaccurate estimation of
QBER can either result in the decline of scheme efficiency
or lead to a higher number of additional communication
rounds. A common approach is to obtain QBER from
the previous stages of the QKD workflow or to employ
some default value of QBER typical for current QKD
setup [13]. However, this lowers key generation rate since
parties disclose redundant bits of the sifted keys to esti-
mate the QBER.
A distinct approach has been considered in Ref. [16].
It is based on the use of syndromes of both parties to ob-
tain on-the-fly estimation of the QBER for each block of
the sifted key. Unfortunately, an estimator considered in
Ref. [16] is suitable only for regular LDPC-codes and it
does not take into account neither punctured nor short-
ened bits. Meanwhile, shortening and puncturing tech-
niques are important tools for the fine-tuning of LDPC-
based schemes.
In this paper we propose a novel on-the-fly QBER esti-
mation approach providing the estimation of the QBER
with the use of syndromes of parties both for irregular
LDPC codes and in the presence of punctured or short-
ened bits. In addition, we consider employing an a priori
QBER distribution to increase accuracy of the estima-
tion as well as combining this approach with the QBER
estimation based on previous post-processing rounds.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we
explain basics of the LDPC-based information reconcil-
iation. In Section III, we present the novel on-the-fly
QBER estimation algorithm, which uses syndromes of
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2the parties and an a priori QBER distribution. Sec-
tion IV provides the results of the suggested algorithm
trial in a real QKD setup. Finally, in Section V we dis-
cuss our results and conclude the paper.
II. INFORMATION RECONCILIATION WITH
LDPC CODES
Here we consider a general scheme of the information
reconciliation based on LDPC codes. We assume that
Alice and Bob posses sifted keys kA and kB correspond-
ingly. These keys are random bit strings of equal length.
An ith bit of Alice’s key kA[i] equals Bob’s ith bit kB [i]
with probability 1 − q and differs otherwise. The value
of q (QBER) indicates how much information was inter-
cepted during the transferring over a quantum channel.
The aim of information reconciliation is to remove dis-
crepancies between the sifted keys and make them iden-
tical on both sides.
A common approach is to use a public authenticated
channel for information reconciliation. However, we as-
sume that all messages transferred through the pub-
lic channel are possibly intercepted by an eavesdropper
(Eve). Thus, parties shall also minimize Eve’s knowledge
about the sifted keys leaked during information reconcil-
iation.
One of the possible ways for removing discrepancies
with a public discussion is to employ LDPC codes, which
are linear error-correcting codes. A particular LDPC
code can be defined with the sparse binary m×n matrix
H (with m < n) called parity-check matrix.
A straightforward way of using an LDPC code is as fol-
lows. Alice computes her syndrome sA := HkA (mod 2)
and sends it to Bob (here the sifted key kA is con-
sidered as a column vector of length n). Then, Bob
tries to find a key k̂A, which is closest to kB such that
Hk̂A (mod 2) = sA. For that purpose he may use dif-
ferent approximate iterative algorithms of syndrome de-
coding such as sum-product [17], min-sum [18], scaled
min-sum [19], and others. Finally, after the decoding
parties can use -almost universal2 (-AU2) hash func-
tions to check whether kA and k̂A are equal up to small
error probability  [15].
Nevertheless, not an arbitrary LDPC code may be used
for information reconciliation. In paper [20] it has been
demonstrated that to correct errors successfully (that is
to obtain k̂A = kA) the following condition must be hold:
f =
m
nh(q)
> 1, (1)
where f is called the efficiency of information reconcil-
iation and h(q) = −q log2 q − (1 − q) log2(1 − q) is the
binary entropy function. We note that m is the length
of a syndrome and it equals the amount of information
leaked during the discussion. Thus, an effective informa-
tion reconciliation protocol must both fulfil the condition
given by Eq. (1) and disclose as little information as it is
possible (i.e. f shall not be too large). Actually, it turns
out that f = 1.1 . . . 1.3 is usually enough for successful
error correction (see e.g. Ref. [12]).
To perform fine tuning of the efficiency f , shortening
and puncturing techniques can be employed [9]. The idea
is to calculate a syndrome not from a block of the sifted
key kA but construct an “extendeded key” k
ext
A . In this
case, nk bits are taken from the sifted key kA, ns bits are
fixed (shortened), and np bits are initialized with true
random values (punctured). The total number of bits
nk + ns + np equals the number of rows n in the parity-
check matrix H. Bob performs the same operations to
obtain an extended key kextB . Note that positions of key,
shortened, and punctured bits inside extended keys come
from pseudo-random number generators initialized with
the same seed at Alice’s and Bob’s side. At the same
time, values of punctured bits come from different truly
random generators since they must be independent.
In the presence of shortened and punctured bits, the
expression of efficiency f has the following from:
f =
m− np
(n− ns − np)h(q) , (2)
as truly random punctured bits decrease the leakage of
the information about sifted key by np bits. Thus, vari-
ation of ns and np (the value ns + np ≡ nd is typically
fixed) allows performing fine tuning of the efficiency f .
Another way to improve the efficiency is to use addi-
tional communication rounds with extra bits from sifted
keys disclosed. This approach is employed in blind [12]
and symmetric blind [14] information reconciliation pro-
tocols, and it allows improving performance of the infor-
mation reconciliation procedure significantly. In this case
the efficiency may be written as follows:
f =
m− np + nadd
(n− ns − np)h(q) , (3)
where nadd is the number of bits disclosed in additional
rounds.
However, it is hard to achieve a desired efficiency since
the actual number of discrepancies between kA and kB
(or equivalently QBER) is unknown before the informa-
tion reconciliation stage takes place. To estimate q Alice
and Bob may employ the following techniques: (i) dis-
close some sifted key bits at random positions over the
public channel prior to information reconciliation and es-
timate q by the number of discrepancies at that positions;
(ii) use some typical level of the QBER as an estimation;
(iii) use the value of the QBER from previous (already
corrected) block of the sifted key; (iv) make an estima-
tion of the QBER using information from syndrome. The
method (i) has an obvious drawback since all the dis-
closed bits have to be discarded from the processed keys,
while the method (ii) can be applied only in the case of
very stable quantum channels. In the following section
we consider methods (iii) and (iv).
3III. ESTIMATION OF THE QBER USING
SYNDROMES
Accuracy of the QBER estimation strongly affects the
efficiency of the information reconciliation. For example,
if QBER is overestimated, parties will use low-rate codes
and the efficiency of reconciliation will be lower than pos-
sible. In contrast, if QBER is underestimated, number
of disclosed bits per round may be less than theoretical
bound and there will be lots of additional communication
rounds required. In this section we describe a novel algo-
rithm which uses information from syndrome to obtain
more accurate QBER estimation.
Let us consider a relative syndrome ∆s := sA +
sB (mod 2), where sB := HkB (mod 2) is a Bob’s syn-
drome. For now we assume that neither shortened nor
punctured bits are used. According Ref. [16], for a reg-
ular LDPC code, that is a code with the parity-check
matrix having the same numbers of unities in each row
and each column, the bits of ∆s turn out to be i.i.d.
Bernoulli random variables with the following probabil-
ity being equal to one:
p(q, dc) := Pr(∆s[i] = 1) =
dc∑
j=1
j mod 2=1
(
dc
j
)
qj(1− q)(dc−j)
(4)
where i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, and dc is the number of unities
in each row of the parity check matrix. To estimate the
QBER q from ∆s one can calculate maximum likelihood
(ML) estimation of p as follows:
pest(∆s) := m
−1
m∑
i=1
∆s[i], (5)
and then use it to obtain the ML estimation of q accord-
ing to the formulae:
qest(∆s) = − (1− 2 · pest(∆s))
1
dc − 1
2
. (6)
We note that this estimator is suitable only for regu-
lar LDPC codes and it takes into account neither punc-
tured nor shortened bits. Below we consider an advanced
version of the estimator which deals with both of these
drawbacks.
First, let us note that even for irregular LDPC codes
all syndrome bits are still Bernoulli random variables.
However, in contrast to the case of regular code they
have different crossover probabilities. In particular, for
ith bit of syndrome the following holds: Pr(∆s[i] = 1) =
p(q, d
(i)
c ), where d
(i)
c is a number of unities in the ith
row of the parity-check matrix. Therefore, we need to
introduce a likelihood function of the QBER value q for
the relative syndrome ∆s in the following form:
L(q|∆s) =
m∏
i=1
∆s[i]=1
p(q, d(i)c )
m∏
j=1
∆s[j]=0
(
1− p(q, d(j)c )
)
=
=
m∏
i=1
[
1−∆s[i] + (2∆s[i]− 1)p(q, d(i)c )
]
.
(7)
Hence, the maximum likelihood estimation of QBER in
the case of irregular LDPC code can be calculated as
follows:
qest = arg max
q∈[0,0.5]
L(q|∆s). (8)
Second, we consider how punctured and shortened bits
affect the bits of syndrome. Let us denote positions of
shortened and punctured bits as S and P correspond-
ingly. Remember, that we have xextA [i] = x
ext
B [i] for i ∈ S,
and two independent uniformly distributed random bits
xextA [i] and x
ext
B [i] for i ∈ P. Let us also introduce po-
sition sets Ai = {j : Hi,j = 1}, i = 1, 2, . . .m, which
are defined as sets of unity positions for each row of the
parity-check matrix H.
Consider a particular position i ∈ {1, 2, . . .m} in the
relative syndrome ∆s. One can see, that if Ai ∩ P 6= ∅,
then the value ∆S[i] turns out to be uniformly dis-
tributed random bit, and could not be used for an es-
timation of the QBER. Then, if Ai ∩ P = ∅ we need to
calculate a number of key bit positions inside Ai. It is
given by d˜
(i)
c := dc − |Ai ∩ S|, where | · | denotes cardi-
nality of the set. Finally, in the presence of shortened
and punctured bits, the likelihood function (7) shall be
rewritten in the following form:
L(q|∆s) =
m∏
i=1
Ai∩P=∅
[
1−∆s[i] + (2∆s[i]− 1)p(q, d˜(i)c )
]
.
(9)
However, there are two more implementation peculiar-
ities of QBER estimator to mention. First, we propose to
multiply likelihood (9) by the “window” function which
takes into account typical values of QBER observed in
experiments. This allows avoiding outliers in the QBER
estimation. In particular, we use a combination of two
sigmoid functions:
L0(q) =
1
1 + e−α1(q−qmin)
· 1
1 + e−α2(qmax−q)
, (10)
where α1, α2, qmin, and qmax are tunable parameters.
Second, we propose to use log-domain for likelihood in
the QBER estimation since it improves numerical stabil-
ity of the method. Thus, the function for ML estima-
tion of QBER takes the form `(q|∆s) = logL(q|∆s) +
logL0(q). In order to find q maximizing `(q|∆s), we use
standard optimization techniques. In particular, we ap-
ply Brent’s method [21] to the (0.0, 0.5) interval.
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FIG. 1. Experimental values of the QBER q for 8Mbit sifted
keys are shown as function of the key block index. Each point
corresponds to a block of 3800 bits.
IV. APPLICATIONS TO INDUSTRIAL QKD
SYSTEMS
Here we consider an implementation of our approach
for a pair of sifted keys generated using the industrial
QKD setup. The setup is described in Ref. [24]. We
employ four pools of LDPC codes with frame lengths
n = 4000, 10000, 20000, 40000. Each pool consists of
nine codes with rates R = {0.5, 0.55, 0.6, . . . 0.9}. The
codes were generated using the improved edge growth
algorithm [22], that was applied to the degree distri-
bution polynomials from Ref. [23]. To provide efficient
fine-tuning of code rate with puncturing and shortening
techniques we set nd = 0.05n. With such the value of
nd we can obtain an arbitrary code rate in range from
R = 9/19 ≈ 0.47 up to R = 18/19 ≈ 0.947. For the
a priori QBER distribution, we use the function given
by Eq. (10) with α1 = α2 = 500, qmin = 0.01 and
qmax = 0.08. The value of qmin corresponds to minimal
value of the QBER achievable on the employed QKD
setup, while qmax is critical value of QBER which allows
distillation of a secret key.
In the demonstration presented below, we consider
sifted keys of 4Mbit total length. The behaviour of the
QBER calculated for block of n = 4000 is shown in Fig. 1.
One can see that actual values of the QBER are indeed
in the chosen (qmin, qmax) range.
We then compare three approaches to the QBER esti-
mation in sifted keys blocks of length 0.95n for each value
of n. First, we consider a one using QBER value from the
previous block (qprev) as an estimation of the QBER in
the current block q. Second, we consider the approach de-
scribed in Ref. III. To obtain a syndrome qsynd we choose
a code from the codes pool and extend sifted key block
of length 0.95n bits with ns shortened and np punctured
bits (ns + np = nd) such that the following approximate
equality holds:
m− np
(n− nd)h(qprev) ≈ 1. (11)
In most cases this equality can not be strictly fulfilled
since m, np, and ns are integers. It should be noted that
given the available ratesR and total number of shortened
and punctured bits nd = 0.05n there is only one appro-
priate code rate from R that fulfills the condition (11).
Finally, we consider a mixed approach with the QBER
estimation taken as the average of two aforementioned
approaches: qmix := 0.5(qprev + qsynd).
To evaluate performance of the approaches we mea-
sure such performance metrics as bias and accuracy of
the estimation, i.e. mean and root mean square of
the q − qest random variable corresponding to the er-
ror of an estimation approach. The Value qest is the
QBER estimation obtained with one of the approaches
(qest ∈ {qprev, qsynd, qmix}).
The results of all three methods performance evalua-
tion are given in Fig. 2 and Table I. Fig. 2 shows the
histograms of q − qest random variable values observed
in the experiments. Table I contains measured values of
bias and accuracy for different frame lengths. One can
see that for small length codes (n = 4000) the syndrome-
based approach is not as precise as the one using previous
value of QBER since the latter has the accuracy by 30 %
better. Nevertheless, for n = 10000 performance of these
two approaches becomes comparable and for n = 40000
syndrome-based approach outperforms the first one. We
also observe rather high bias of the syndrome-based ap-
proach. It turns out that the estimate of the error ap-
pears to typically higher than the actual error level. The
estimate using previous QBER value does not suffer from
such shortcoming.
The most interesting result is that for all frame lengths
the mixed approach provides the most accurate estima-
tion. The advantage of the mixed approach comes from
the fact that two first estimates are uncorrelated and
the bias caused by syndrome-based estimation diminishes
when taking into account the estimation using previous
QBER. Thus, the average of two estimations turns out to
be better than each of the estimations separately. This
is an important observation of the present study.
It should be noted that in qmix we considered equal
weighting factors (1/2) for qprev and qsynd. It seems that
the accuracy of the mixed approach may be improve by
adaptive changing of these factors according to the ac-
curacy of two basic estimators. Also, we may add some
constant to decrease the bias from syndrome-based ap-
proach. However, these improvements are beyond the
scope of the current paper and are the directions of our
further research.
V. CONCLUSION
QKD systems are the prominent solution of guaran-
teeing secure data transmission even under the threat
of quantum computer existence. A precise estimation of
QBER level at the stage of information reconciliation is
crucial for the efficiency of QKD systems. In this paper,
we have considered the problem of the accurate QBER
estimation at the stage of information reconciliation of
the QKD post-processing procedure. We have proposed
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FIG. 2. Probability density functions of q− qprev (dashed line), q− qsynd (dotted line), and q− qmix (solid line) for LDPC codes
with frame lengths n = 4, 000 (a), 10,000 (b), 20,000 (c), 40,000 (d).
Frame length n 4000 10000 20000 40000
Number of sifted key bits n− ns − np 3800 9500 19000 38000
Accuracy of the error estimation using
previous QBER
√
(q − qprev)2
0.0040 0.0028 0.0026 0.0026
Bias of the error estimation
using previous QBER q − qprev
1.3 · 10−6 5.4 · 10−6 1.1 · 10−5 5.6 · 10−5
Accuracy of the error estimation
using syndrome
√
(q − qsynd)2
0.0055 0.0030 0.0021 0.0017
Bias of the error estimation
using syndrome q − qsynd
-0.0020 -0.0011 -0.00082 -0.00077
Accuracy of the error estimation
in the mixed approach
√
(q − qmix)2
0.0034 0.0021 0.0017 0.0015
Bias of the error estimation
in the mixed approach q − qmix
-0.0010 -0.00057 -0.00041 -0.00036
TABLE I. Comparison results of the considered error estimation approaches for different frame lengths n.
6a novel method for the QBER estimation, which employs
likelihood of a syndrome obtained from LDPC codeword.
In contrast to previous works, our approach is relevant
for irregular LDPC codes and in the presence of both
shortened and punctured bits as well. Moreover, we have
provided a practical form for an a priori QBER distribu-
tion.
We have applied our approach to sifted keys gener-
ated in the industrial QKD setup. We have shown that
combination of the proposed approach with the approach
using error value from the previous round allows improv-
ing the accuracy of QBER estimation. We note that the
use of proposed approach should be promising in different
ways of using LDPC codes for information reconciliation
within QKD post-processing. Particularly, it seems to be
useful in rate-adaptive [9, 10], blind [12], and symmetric-
blind information reconciliation protocols [14].
Finally, we would like to mention that on-the-fly
syndrome-based error estimation is especially promising
in cases of highly unstable quantum channel which may
undergo large sudden fluctuations in its properties. In
this case, the accurate QBER estimation is able to pro-
vide a notable improvement in the secret key generation
rate.
Acknowledgments. The work was supported by the
RFBR (Grant No. 18-37-00096).
[1] P.W. Shor, SIAM J. Comput. 26, 1484 (1997).
[2] N. Gisin, G. Ribordy, W. Tittel, and H. Zbinden, Rev.
Mod. Phys. 74, 145 (2002).
[3] H.-K. Lo, M. Curty, and K. Tamaki, Nat. Photonics 8,
595 (2014).
[4] E. Diamanti, H.-K. Lo, and Z. Yuan, npj Quant. Inf. 2,
16025 (2016).
[5] C.H. Bennet and G. Brassard, in Proceedings of the IEEE
International Conference on Computers, Systems and
Signal Processing Bangalore, India (IEEE, New York,
1984), p. 175.
[6] R. Gallager, IRE Trans. Inf. Theory 8, 21 (1962).
[7] D.J.C. MacKay, IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory 45, 399 (1999).
[8] A. Shokrollahi, Prog. Com. Sc. 23, 85 (2004).
[9] D. Elkouss, J. Mart´ınez-Mateo, and V. Martin, in Pro-
ceedings of the IEEE International Symposium on Infor-
mation Theory and its Applications (ISITA), Taichung,
Taiwan (IEEE, 2010), p. 179.
[10] D. A. Kronberg, Mat. Vopr. Kriptogr. 8(2), 7786 (2017).
[11] D. Elkouss, J. Mart´ınez-Mateo, and V. Martin, Quant.
Inf. Comp. 11, 226 (2011).
[12] J. Mart´ınez-Mateo, D. Elkouss, and V. Martin, Quant.
Inf. Comp. 12, 791-812 (2012)
[13] E.O. Kiktenko, A.S. Trushechkin, Y.V. Kurochkin, and
A.K. Fedorov, J. Phys. Conf. Ser. 741, 012081 (2016).
[14] E.O. Kiktenko, A.S. Trushechkin, C.C.W. Lim, Y.V.
Kurochkin, and A.K. Fedorov, Phys. Rev. Applied 8,
044017 (2017).
[15] A.K. Fedorov, E.O. Kiktenko, and A.S. Trushechkin,
Lobachevskii J. Math. 39, 992 (2018).
[16] P. Treeviriyanupab et al., 14th International Sympo-
sium on Communications and Information Technologies
(ISCIT), Incheon, 2014, 351-355 (2014).
[17] X.-Y. Hu, E. Eleftheriou, D.-M. Arnold, and A. Dholakia,
in Proceedings of Global Telecommunications Conference,
(2001), p. 1879
[18] M. .C. Fossorier, M. Mihaljevic, and H. Imai, IEEE
Trans. Commun. 47(5), 683-680 (1999).
[19] A.A. Emran and M. Elsabrouty, 2014 IEEE 11th
Consumer Communications and Networking Conference
(CCNC), Las Vegas, NV, 2014, 518-523 (2014).
[20] D. Slepian and J. Wolf, IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory 19, 471-
480 (1973).
[21] R.P. Brent, in Algorithms for Minimization without
Derivatives (1973).
[22] J. Mart´ınez-Mateo, D. Elkouss, and V. Martin, IEEE
Comm. Lett. 14, 1155 (2010).
[23] D. Elkouss, A. Leverrier, R. Alleaume, and J.J. Boutros
in Proceedings of IEEE International Symposium on In-
formation Theory, (2009), p. 1879.
[24] A.V. Duplinskiy, E.O. Kiktenko, N.O. Pozhar, M.N.
Anufriev, R.P. Ermakov, A.I. Kotov, A.V. Brodskiy,
R.R. Yunusov, V.L. Kurochkin, A.K. Fedorov, and Y.V.
Kurochkin, J. Russ. Laser Res. 39, 113 (2018).
